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ADMINISTERING UNEMPLOYMENT
COMPENSATION BENEFIT CLAIMS
WALTER F. DODD*
The discussion in this article is based on the assumptions that state laws may
constitutionally be enacted to conform to the Federal Social Security Act and that this
act will be held to be a valid exercise of Congressional power. Nothing herein is to
be construed as expressing concurrence either with the federal legislation or with the
assumption that it is constitutional. The only issue here discussed is that as to
methods of administration of state laws. This primarily involves the organization
for the purpose of administering the law, and the procedure from the time a claim
is filed under the law, although the problems of administration cannot, of course, be
severed from the substantive provisions of law that are to be administered.
The form of administrative organization is, of course, conditioned by the task to
be performed. The things to be done with respect to unemployment compensation
are in many respects similar to those in workmen's compensation, and it is therefore
to be expected that the administrative organization and procedure should be in large
part copied from workmen's compensation laws. But in the enactment of the new
laws, the legislatures are not disturbed by certain problems which faced the drafts-
men of the original workmen's compensation laws, and are in a position to profit
by experience in the administration of such laws. It is natural, therefore, to find in
the unemployment compensation laws no use of trial by jury, and greater use of
finality of fact determination by administrative bodies. It is natural also to find
repeated the provisions of workmen's compensation laws as to compulsion to produce
testimony, self-incrimination, the avoidance of technical rules of evidence and of
procedure, and judicial review of administrative determinations.
In both unemployment compensation and workmen's compensation there is (i) a
large task of administrative supervision which may be termed ministerial in char-
acter; (2) the examination and approval or disapproval of the great bulk of claims
where there will be no contest of the claim or of the action denying a claim; the
problem here is largely ministerial, but involves also a wide discretionary power, and
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the proper exercise of this power will diminish the number of contested claims;
(3) the determination of contested claims. In workmen's compensation, the most
satisfactory procedure with respect to contested claims has been that of an initial
administrative hearing, with a review on appeal by some body or person who did
not participate in or have an interest in the decision resulting from the initial hearing.
Finality of fact-determination by administrative bodies is proper where adequately
safeguarded, but such adequate safeguard requires that there be both an administra-
tive hearing and a possibility of administrative review, before appeal may be had to
the court on issues of law.
The most essential point in any scheme of unemployment compensation is that
of investigation of claims that are not contested; the next most essential point is
that of the initial hearing upon a contested claim. The great bulk of claims will not
be contested; and the decision on the initial hearing will in fact be final as to the
great majority.of claims that are contested. The initial investigation and allowance
of uncontested claims will be much more important in unemployment compensation
than in workmen's compensation. In workmen's compensation there is an employer-
employee relationship, and, except under exclusive state funds, an adversary relation
exists between the employee on the one side and the employer or insurance carrier
on the other. The issues of contest are more clearly defined under workmen's com-
pensation; a claim is uncontested only when there appears no ground for contest;
and no claim is settled without some investigation by a directly interested person
or corporation. Unemployment compensation, on the other hand, will in most cases
stand more nearly in contrast with workmen's compensation under an exclusive state
fund, as in Ohio, where there is no specific and direct interest upon the part of the
employer. But the workmen's compensation issues even under an exclusive state
fund are more specific, and merit rating gives some specific interest to the employer.
Yet experience during a period of depression has shown that the exclusive state fund
under workmen's compensation is not sufficiently protected.
Whatever may be the defects of the system of employer reserves' adopted in Wis-
consin and Utah, and to some extent in Oregon, there remains under such laws a
specific liability which may afford more ample protection to a fund as contrasted
with the state-wide pooled fund. Pecuniary interest presents the strongest means of
assuring that improper claims or improper amounts of claims are not allowed. This
pecuniary incentive in Wisconsin and Utah may be restricted and the adoption of
the pooled fund may be forced by refusal to permit adequate credit of employers'
contributions against the tax imposed by the Federal Social Security Act. If the
power of Congress to adopt the Social Security Act is sustained, the character of the
state law will be completely within federal control. The laws that have adopted the
single pooled plan (except the New York act, the first to adopt this plan) provide, it
is true, for ratings of employers in 1941 and thereafter on the basis of unemployment
'This system is discussed in Brandeis, The Employer Reserve Type of Unemployment Compensatlion
Law, supra, p. 54.
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experience,2 but the value of such provisions as a means of protecting the fund is
doubtful, in view of the experience with merit rating in Ohio. The employer-
employee relation is not directly maintained, and although notice of action upon the
employee's claim may be required to be sent to the most recent employer, the
pecuniary interest is too remote to protect a public fund.
In the nature of things, unemployment compensation will promote unemploy-
ment in certain groups, just as health insurance has promoted sickness, and as
workmen's compensation promotes continued disability in certain types of cases.
Laws will not change human nature, but they may provide safeguards against abuses
occasioned by certain types of human reactions. Where a specific employer's account
is affected by a claim, as in Wisconsin and Utah, notice of a claim to the employer
creates a sufficient adversary relation, and produces a contest, where the claim may
be regarded as improper. Where there is a pooled fund, notice to the most recent
employer will usually not create a contest even of an improper claim, and protection
of a fund must be provided by some other means, if at all.
Different types of administrative organization have been adopted by the states
that have enacted unemployment compensation acts. A conference of Labor Depart-
ment officials held in Asheville, North Carolina, on October 5, 1935, urged the desir-
ability "of placing the administration of state unemployment compensation in the
state agency generally responsible for the administration of labor legislation." It is
doubtful whether such a broad suggestion will find support. It is not possible to
establish a uniform pattern for all states. 3 In Alabama, California, Massachusetts
and Washington, separate commissions have been established to administer unem-
ployment compensation, and to have supervision of public employment offices; for
the District of Columbia a separate board is created composed of the commissioners
of the District as members ex officio, and one representative of employers and one of
employees. In Oregon the members of the State Industrial Accident Commission
(the body administering workmen's compensation) constitute the State Unemploy-
ment Compensation Commission which also controls free public employment offices.
In Wisconsin and Utah unemployment compensation is placed under the industrial
commissions which also administer the other labor laws of these states. In New
Hampshire the Commissioner of Labor administers the act. In New York the
administration is placed in the hands of the Industrial Commissioner, who is the
head of the State Department of Labor, and a salaried state appeal board of three
members is created. Provision is made generally by unemployment compensation
acts for a state advisory board composed of representatives of employers, employees
and of the general public, each in the same number.
Which method of organization is best must be left to future determination, and
it is probable that, as in workmen's compensation, no one plan will be found to be
2 This system is discussed in Rubinow, State Pool Plans and Merit Rating, supra, p. 65.
'For the types of organizations adopted, see Cook, The Bodies Administering Unemployment Com-
pensation Laws, supra, p. 95.
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the best. The essential things are that there be a close correlation of the functions
of investigation and of administrative adjudication; and that both the administrative
responsibility and the review of administrative determinations be vested in officers
or bodies not too busy to perform their duties. There has been some difficulty where
administrative review is independent of the original administrative hearing and of
the task of investigation. New York and Pennsylvania have such an organization
for workmen's compensation, and New York now applies this plan to unemployment
compensation. Such a plan, to operate successfully, requires the co6peration of the
department and of the independent board, and a different type of organization may
well avoid difficulties which are at times presented by the absence of such co6peration.
Much may be said in favor of an independent commission administering unemploy-
ment compensation and public employment offices; though, if the burden is not too
heavy, the same result of co6rdinated administration may be obtained by combining
unemployment compensation with the administration of all other labor laws by a
single commission, as in Utah and Wisconsin. Such combination, however, is likely
to make an administrative review by the commission a purely perfunctory matter
because the commission is too busy with other matters; under such conditions admin-
istrative review should be provided before some other body which can in fact hear
the issues, and provision is so made in Wisconsin and Utah.
With respect to claims procedure, public employment offices serve as the places
for registration and usually for the filing of claims, and one of the conditions for
approval of state laws in order to get federal grants for the expense of administration
and in order that employers may get credit against the federal tax is that provision
shall be made for "payment of unemployment compensation solely through public
employment offices in the state or such other agencies as the [Social Security] Board
may approve."' In New York the manager of the local state employment office at
which the employee is registered receives the claim, sends notice to the employee's
last employer, and, in accordance with rules of the Industrial Commissioner, de-
termines the validity of the claim and the amount of benefits.' The employee or any
other party affected by the finding may apply for a hearing before the manager, and
from the manager's decision on such hearing, an appeal may be taken to the state
appeal board of three members, any one of whom may act for the board.0 A decision
of the manager, if not appealed from, is final on all questions of fact and law, and a
decision of the appeal board is final on all questions of fact, and, unless appealed
from, is final on all questions of law.7 From the appeal board an appeal on questions
of law may be taken to the Appellate Division of the Third District, and an appeal
may then be taken to the Court of Appeals as is provided for other civil actions.8
This outline of New York procedure indicates a broad power in the manager of
'Social Security Act of Aug. 14, x935, Public, No. 271, 74th Cong., ist Sess., tit. III, §303 (a) (2),
tit. IX, §903 (a) (i).
"N. Y. CONS. LAws, C. 31, art. 18, §5o (3) (N. Y. Laws 1935, C. 486).
6ld. §510 (4). "Id. §510 (6). 'Id. S5bo (7).
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the local state employment office. If he decides for the claimant, the decision is final
if no one is sufficiently interested to appeal, and no one is likely to be sufficiently
interested. No power is given to the Industrial Commissioner to question the de-
cision unless he be a "party affected who appeared at the hearing before the man-
ager," a construction which is doubtful. The fund is not adequately protected
against improper awards, because of the absence of any person with a sufficient ad-
versary interest to make a contest, but the employee is fully protected by provisions
for appeal. A gesture of protection for the state fund appears in the provision that:
"When the appeal board affirms a decision of a manager allowing benefits, such
benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which may thereafter be taken to the
courts . . . but if the said decision is finally reversed by the courts, the commissioner
shall have a right of action for the recovery of the moneys paid pursuant to said
decision."' 0
In New York, it is true, provision is made for a continuing jurisdiction in the
Industrial Commissioner, upon his own initiative or upon application of any party
in interest, to review an award of benefits or a denial of a claim therefor "on the
ground of a change in conditions, or because of a mistake as to fact,"11 and similar
provisions are found in other acts; 12 but defects in the original award are not likely
to be effectively checked through this power. The New Hampshire procedure is
similar to that of New York. 13 Under the California law, the Commission controls
as to whether claims shall be filed with the manager of the public employment office
for the district or with a deputy of the commission designated for the purpose, and
the investigation is made by the officer with whom filed, but provision is made for
direct appeal to the commission only by the claimant.14
Wisconsin, although less in need of safeguards, because of the pecuniary interest
of the employer in his own reserves, has made more satisfactory provision for the
initial investigation by "a deputy designated by the commission."'15 Not only this,
but the Commission is also given power "to remove or transfer the proceedings on
any claim pending before a deputy, appeal tribunal or commissioner," with full
power to alter any decision or to direct the taking of new evidence.' 6 A number of
the other laws vest complete control in the central organization by permitting it to
designate the officer to make the original investigation, and by empowering it to take
control of proceedings on any pending claim.' 7 Such provisions are necessary if
uniform and competent administration is to be had, and these provisions are much
more essential where there is a pooled fund than where there is an individual em-
ployer reserve. There is no assurance that the manager of a local employment office
'ld. §510 (4). 0 ibid. 'Id. §505 (2).
'Utah Laws 1935, H. B. No. 86, §12; cf. Ore. Law 1935, Spec. Sess., H. B. No. 7r, §9.
" N. H. Laws 1935, C. 99, §§30-39. 11 Cal. Stat. 1935, c. 352, art. 6.
'WIs. STAT. §108.09 (2). "Id. §1o8.o9 (6).
"'Ala. Laws 1935, Sen. B. No. 395, §7 (a), (f); MASS. GEaN LAws, c. 15IA, §§34, 36 (Mass. Laws
1935, C. 479); N. H. Laws 1935, C. 99, §§3, 35; Wash. Laws 1935, c. i45, §8 (2), (6); WIs. STAT.
(1935) §xo8.9 (2), (6).
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has the experience needed for the determination of claims, and his contact with
other aspects of unemployment may make it undesirable to require that he be used
for this purpose. Moreover, the determination of claims should not be under local
control, but should be a matter of uniform state policy.
With respect to administrative hearing and review, there are some differences
among the laws, all of which, however, provide or profess to provide for one original
hearing and for one review by a body other than that holding the original hearing.
In Utah a hearing may be had before the officer of the employment office or before
a salaried umpire designated by the Commission, with an appeal to a district appeal
board, and thence to a state appeal board, with the necessity then of seeking a rehear-
ing before the Industrial Commission before review may be sought in the Supreme
Court.18 This procedure, which will, of course, be used in few cases, appears to be
unduly complicated, though it must be borne in mind that judicial review is directly
by the highest court of the state of Utah. In Oregon, on the other hand, the original
investigation may be made without hearing, and unless a rehearing is sought before
the Commission, the action of the deputy or employee designated by the Commission
to make such investigation "as he deems necessary," is considered the decision of the
Commission.' 9 In Massachusetts a hearing may be demanded before the local or
branch employment office official and "any party affected by such decision of the
local or branch employment office official may file an appeal in such manner and
within such time as the Commission may require, with such appeal board as the
Commission may by rule establish for said purpose."20  This gives more discretion'
as to administrative organization and procedure than is usually found in state laws.
In creating original or intermediate appeal boards, the laws of Alabama,2 1 the
District of Columbia,22 New Hampshire,23 Utah,24 Washington,21; and Wisconsin 20
contain provisions which appear to be a hang-over from early compensation statutes.
Appeal boards are established with a full time salaried employee as chairman, and
with two other members, one representing employees and one representing em-
ployers, but with provision under most of the statutes that the chairman alone may
act in the absence of one or both the others, provided they had notice of the session.
This recalls the theory of arbitration present in many of the early compensation
laws, and still remaining in some, but of which very little use has been made in
practice.
The use of lawyers or other representatives in the presentation of unemployment
compensation claims involves a problem not dissimilar from that existing in work-
men's compensation; the issues are less definite, but, on the other hand, are by no
means so complex as those involved in contested workmen's compensation cases.
"Utah Laws 1935, H. B. No. 86, §51-1g. "Ore. Laws 1935, H. B. No. 71, §9.
'MAss. GEN. LAws, c. 1iA, §§34, 35 (Mass. Laws 1935, C. 479).
' Ala. Laws 1935, Sen. B. No. 395, §7 f.
'Dist. of Col., Public, No. 386, 74 th Cong. Ist Sess. (x935), §12 (d).
ON. H. Laws 1935, C. 99, §35. "Utah Laws 1935, H. B. No. 71, §9.
'Wash. Laws 1935, c. 145, §8 (6). "Ws. STAT. §xo8.09 (4).
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Here again, the question as to the existence of an adversary relation presents itself.
Aside from the states having exclusive state funds, contested workmen's compensa-
tion claims involve representation of two adverse parties. Except' for the states
having individual employer reserves, claims under unemployment compensation will
be against a single fund, and the contest will primarily be one by the claimant against
denial of an award or reduction of a claim. In such cases there will probably be
much the same type of abuse as in workmen's compensation. Efforts to prevent
solicitation and to avoid abuses by those representing claimants have not proved
effective in workmen's compensation. Some states and many bar associations have
thought they could correct the evils by limiting representation to lawyers, and the
New York unemployment compensation act forbids the allowance of fees for repre-
sentation unless the agent or representative is an attorney and counsellor at law.27
In theory the lawyer is better trained to handle cohtested claims for compensation,
and, in theory also, he is subject to stricter discipline than those who are not mem-
bers of the bar. But experience with workmen's compensation suggests a grave
doubt as to whether lay representation of claimants is less efficient or less honest than
that of the lawyer. A more direct protection to the claimant is sought through con-
trol of fees. For unemployment compensation claims, New York limits claims for
services to ten per cent, and requires that such claims be approved by the Industrial
Commissioner in order to be enforcible.2s Wisconsin does not go so far, but requires
commission approval of fees in excess of ten per cent.29 Experience with workmen's
compensation indicates that control of fees must be mandatory if it is to be effective.
Solicitation is a misdemeanor under the New York act,"0 but penalties alone may
accomplish little toward curbing a practice which has as yet been little controlled in
the field of workmen's compensation.
In the methods of administrative organization and procedure adopted by the
several states will be found the influence of model unemployment compensation bills
drafted in Washington. In view of the fact that it must approve the state laws, the
Social Security Board has recently drafted two unemployment compensation bills-
one based on the pooled fund plan with merit rating, and the other on separate em-
ployer reserves but with alternative provisions for partial pooled accounts.31 The
bills so drafted properly contain alternative provisions as to the form of organization
for the administration of unemployment compensation. Both bills wisely follow the
Wisconsin plan in providing that the original investigation shall be by "a deputy or
representative designated by the commission"32 and in vesting complete supervisory
control in the commission. 33 The Board's drafts contemplate an administrative hear-
ing before an appeal tribunal composed, in the discretion of the commission, of either
'N. Y. CONSOL. LAWS, C. 31, art.. 8, §511 (2) (N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 486).
'81d. §51x (3). 'Wis. STAT. §xo8.iox.
"N. Y. CONSOL. LAws, supra note 27, §511 (3).
" Soc. Sec. Bd., Draft Bills for State Unemployment Compensation of Pooled Fund and Employer
Reserve Account Types (Jan. 1936).
Id. §6 (b). "Id. §6 (e), (f).
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a salaried examiner or a commissioner or of a board of three members consisting of
a salaried officer and of one representative of employers and one of employees.8 4
The alternative of a three-member board for such hearings is unimportant, for its
use lies in the discretion of the commission, and initial hearings will in fact be held
by full-time employees. Under the drafts, the initial hearing is held by the appeal
tribunal and the decision of such tribunal becomes the decision of the commission
and is final as to issues of fact "unless within ten days after the date of such decisions,
the commission acts on its own motion or permits any of the parties to initiate
further appeal or review." 3' Here again the drafts follow the Wisconsin practice in
that administrative review is not a matter of right but rests in the discretion of the
commission; this plan has not proved unsatisfactory in the administration of work-
men's compensation in Wisconsin, but where there is an adversary relation between
the parties, it appears safest to have review as a matter of right if the administrative
determination of fact is to be final. In practice, however, in case of contest much of
the unemployment compensation will be paid on the basis of the appeal tribunal's
action, by virtue of the provision that "if an appeal tribunal affirms a decision of a
deputy, or the commission affirms a decision of an appeal tribunal, allowing benefits,
such benefits shall be paid regardless of any appeal which may thereafter be taken,
but if such decision is finally reversed, no employer's account shall be charged with
benefits so paid." 6 The Board's drafts are to be commended as seeking to centralize
administrative control within each state.
In any discussion of state laws, attention must, of course, be given to the pro-
visions of the Federal Social Security Act. Without the approval of a state law by
the Social Security Board, no state may receive a federal grant for unemployment
compensation administration,37 and no employer may receive credit against the
federal tax for contributions under a state law. 8 Not only must the state law be
approved in first instance, but the Board has continuing authority to decline to
certify any state for the federal grant or the taxpayers' credit.30 There is, therefore,
a complete control by the Federal Board in the application of the standards established
by federal law, and a wide discretion may be exercised as to whether such standards
have in first instance been met or continue to be met by the methods of state admin-
istration. Moreover, in view of the fact that public employment offices are used
under all the state laws, and were intended by the Social Security Act to be so used,40
the Department of Labor has a similar continuing supervision over employment
offices under the National Employment System Act of June 6, 1933.41 But the Social
Security Act is the most important. Section 303 (a) of this act provides, among other
things, that the law of a state shall include provisions for:
-1d. §6 (d). 'Id. §6 (c). -Id. §6 (b).
'Social Security Act, supra note i, tit. III §303 a.
"Id., tit. IX §902. 'Id. §903 (b).
"'Id., tit. III, §303 (a) (1), tit. IX, §903 (a) (z).
a48 STAT. 114, 29 U. S. C. A. (Supp.) c. 4 C. For a discussion of the relation of the United States
Employment Service to the administration of unemployment compensation laws, see Stead, The RWle of
the Public Employment Service in the Unemployment Compensation Program, supra, p. zoo.
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"(I) Such methods of administration (other than those relating to selection, tenure of
office, and compensation of personnel) as are found by the Board to be reasonably calcu-
lated to insure full payment of unemployment compensation when due; and
(2) Payment of unemployment compensation solely through public employment offices
in the State or such other agencies as the Board may approve; and
(3) Opportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial tribunal, for all individuals
whose claims for unemployment compensation are denied. . .
Section 303 (b) provides that:
"(b) Whenever the Board, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing to the
State agency charged with the administration of the State law, finds that in the administra-
tion of the law there is-
(i) a denial, in a substantial number of cases, of unemployment compensation to
individuals entitled thereto under such law; or
(2) a failure to comply substantially with any provision specified in subsection (a);
the Board shall notify such State agency that further payments will not be made to the
State until the Board is satisfied that there is no longer any such denial or failure to comply.
Until it is so satisfied it shall make no further certification to the Secretary of the Treasury
with respect to such State."
Section 903 (a) makes a number of requirements as to the provisions of state
laws, but subdivision (5) perhaps gives the broadest discretion of the Federal Board
in the continuing supervision of state administration:
"(5) Compensation shall not be denied in such State to any otherwise eligible in-
dividual for refusing to accept new work under any of the following conditions: (A) If the
position offered is vacant due directly to a strike, lockout or other labor dispute; (B) if the
wages, hours, or other conditions of the work offered are substantially less favorable to the
individual than those prevailing for similar work in the locality; (C) if as a condition of
being employed the individual would be required to join a company union or to resign
from or refrain from joining any bona fide labor organization."
Through the powers conferred, the Social Security Board may control the actual
operation of state laws. If, in its opinion, there is, either through state admin-
istrative or court action, "a denial, in a substantial number of cases, of unemployment
compensation to individuals entitled thereto under such law" or if compensation is
denied where, in its opinion, "the wages, hours or other conditions of the work
offered are substantially less favorable to the individual than those prevailing for
similar work in the locality," it may go far to destroy industry in the state involved,
unless there is immediate obedience to its orders. It is true, of course, that notice
and an opportunity to be heard are provided with respect to the refusal of federal
funds, but this places little limitation upon the wide discretion of the federal body.
Although no abuse is to be expected from the present membership of the Social
Security Board, the powers conferred upon it offer great possibilities for the future.
An effort has been made to avoid the dominance of one party in the Social Security
Board and in certain of the state unemployment compensation commissions, but a
non-political administration is not accomplished by representation of two parties, or
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by fairly long and staggered terms of office. Politics has been the most serious single
problem in the state administration of workmen's compensation, and the administra-
tion in the several states has not consistently been of a high grade, but federal stand-
ardization would have reduced all to a common level of mediocrity. Conditions
during the past twenty-five years would probably have been much worse had the
administration of state compensation laws been under a centralized control in Wash-
ington. Greater opportunities present themselves in unemployment compensation,
because the issues are less definite and there will, as to most claims, be no party
who has a sufficient direct interest to investigate the basis of the claim. The final
determination will thus in many cases rest with the manager of a state public em-
ployment office. Politics has been dominant in the public employment offices in
some states, and perhaps it will not disappear even though opposed both by the
Department of Labor and by the Social Security Board. Unfortunately, also, future
political influences in the Social Security Board itself are made possible by the/
provision that "appointments of attorneys and experts may be made without regard
to the civil service laws,"'42 and by the omission to provide any limitations upon the
executive power to remove members of the Board. It may be that the members of
this Board do not fall within the scope of the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Rathbun v. United States,43 but there would have been wisdom
in attempting to protect them from removal without cause. Unemployment com-
pensation has an uncertain actuarial basis at best; if politics intervenes or if there is
a failure of adequate investigation of claims, it will become but an illusive dream to
the worker.
In order to obtain a successful administration of unemployment compensation,
there must be (i) a sufficient employer interest in each specific claim for compensa-
tion; (2) a centralized state control of the machinery designed for action upon claims;
(3) a limitation of federal supervision, and a maintenance of state responsibility for
the administration of the plan; and (4) an avoidance of conditions which will make
possible the use of the plan as an aid to political organizations. In all of these re-
spects a basis for failure has been laid in much that has been done. Experiments
must be made in the initiation of any new plan, but mistakes may to some extent
be avoided by the anticipation of difficulties that are likely to arise and by the use of
knowledge gained from experience with similar problems in the past.
"Social Security Act, supra note i, tit. VII, 5703.
i 295 U. S. 6o2 (1935).
